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ASSESSING CLAIMS TO REVISE THE LAWS OF WAR
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes
For better or worse, participants in a civilization of science and technology are locked in
a relentless process of research and a frenzied, competitive drive to apply the results wher-
ever they promise enhanced productivity and profit. Each innovation stimulates further in-
novations and thejuggernaut of development roars on. As for the law that would regulate it
all, thanks to its characteristic deliberative and measured methods, it often lags behind the
innovations, leaving intervals of legal gap in which authority becomes uncertain.
Weapons and their delivery systems are no exception to this dynamic. They, too, evolve
inexorably, as do the identity, character, and modus operandi of manifest and latent adver-
saries. The first imperative of every territorial community-hence the first imperative of the
international law that these communities have created-is provision for national defense.
That part of the legal regime that establishes the licit means and modes for the maintenance
by each community of its national defense is necessarily a response to the common needs
and common interests of politically relevant actors in the system. Their felt necessities de-
termine the content of the law and, in its crafting, take account of a wide range of factors,
such as the current and projected technology and quanta of weapons; their modes of ap-
plication; geography and geostrategic implications in specific contexts; and, of course, the
characteristics, objectives, and capacities of manifest and latent adversaries. When some of
these factors change to the point that communities can no longer assure their defense with-
in the ambit of inherited law, those charged with national defense inevitably demand changes
in the law.
I.
International law is still largely a decentralized process, in which much lawmaking (par-
ticularly for the most innovative matters) is initiated by unilateral claim, whether explicit or
behavioral. Claims to change inherited security arrangements, or any other part of the law,
ignite a process of counterclaims, responses, replies, and rejoinders until stable expectations
of right behavior emerge. Since every legal regime perforce benefits some actors more than
others, no sooner does a new normative arrangement stabilize than it, too, comes under
stress from new claims for change, in an ongoing bargaining process between sometimes rap-
idly shifting coalitions. Hence the ceaseless dialectic of international law: Whether by diplo-
matic communication or state behavior, one state claims from others acquiescence in a new
practice. Insofar as that new practice is accepted in whole or in part, the practice becomes
part of the law. But inherited law, especially in the form of lex scripta, manifests no such
dynamism. As a consequence, there will often be tensions between formally prescribed law
from a previous period and contemporary customary law.
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Lawyers sometimes forget that specific arrangements in law are not a value in themselves
but, as Rudolf vonjhering put it, are a "means to an end,"1 the attainment of the fundamen-
tal goals of all law-the minimization of violence, the maintenance of minimum order, and
as approximate an achievement of the policies of human dignity as each situation allows.
Specialists in international law in particular tend to rally behind inherited arrangements; they
assume that because the international legal system is weak, a principal duty is to defend ex-
isting prescriptions, whatever the consequence. Thus, international lawyers frequently re-
spond to the appearance of a discrepancy between existing and emerging legal arrange-
ments by heatedly rejecting the new "with a fury of virtuous unanimity [against] the evil whose
name is Change."2 Lost in the righteous fury is a dispassionate assessment of the extent to
which the old arrangements are likely to work in contexts different from those in which they
were originally established or the extent to which the new arrangements may better secure,
in possible future contexts, law's fundamental goals.
II.
The law setting the conditions under which states may resort to military force, the jus ad
bellum, was shaped in the early part of the twentieth century and largely codified in the United
Nations Charter. The unilateral and discretionary use of proactive military force, until then
lawful, was henceforth prohibited; reactive military force was to be limited to self-defense and
then only insofar as, and until, the international community could come to the assistance of
a victim of unlawful military force. All uses of force were to be necessary, proportional, and
discriminating.
Among the factors that made such a novel legal regime acceptable to those charged with
the maintenance of national security within states was the unprecedented undertaking by the
major powers in the Security Council to cooperate to ensure the collective defense of victims
of aggression. Even those who assumed that the Security Council would wield the power the
Charter assigned it in each appropriate case did not imagine that it would act quickly. But
time was less of the essence then than now, given the character and potential of the arsenals
of adversaries. Arsenals consisted essentially of kinetic weapons of relatively limited range,
often requiring significant time for pre-positioning before activation. Prior to the expanded
development and refinement of air warfare, weapons were usually limited in reach to the pe-
ripheries of the territorial communities that might come under attack. A surprise attack could
thus be costly to its victim but not decisive. Most important, critical weapons were likely to be
available in militarily significant quanta only to other states whose elites, however different
their cultures and values, generally shared a continuing interest in the maintenance of the
state system, of which all were part. Each elite's own territorial base made it at once member
and beneficiary of, as well as hostage to, the system, susceptible to the ongoing dynamic of rec-
iprocity and retaliation that generates the effectiveness of international law.
All of these factors shaped a common interest in a legal regime restricting the contin-
gencies for self-defense to an actual armed attack. Indeed, as late as 1986, the International
Court ofJustice, in the watershed decision in the Nicaragua case, purported to limit the right
of self-defense even further to an armed attack of significant scale, thereby prohibiting unilateral
acts of self-defense in response to what came to be called "low-level warfare."3 One may ques-
tion the wisdom of the Court's decision, but it indubitably represented a considered policy.
At times when the Security Council was frozen by the Cold War, self-defense would become
'RUDOLF VONJHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (1913).
2 R. H. TAwNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 68 (1926).
'Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP.14, 103-04,
para. 195 (June 27).
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the only real response to attack. As long as determining the contingency for resort to defen-
sive violence was left to the discretion of a beleaguered state, the Court apparently reasoned,
international violence would be minimized if the legal threshold for resort to self-defense
were set higher rather than lower.
III.
The development of weapons roared on, as did their proliferation. Wholly apart from the
doubts that had arisen about the effectiveness of the Security Council, the introduction of
vastly more destructive and rapidly delivered weapons began to put the efficacy of the legal
regime itself into question. The reason was simple: the opportunity for meaningful self-de-
fense could be irretrievably lost if an adversary, armed with much more destructive weapons
and poised to attack, had to be allowed to initiate (which could mean, in effect, to accomplish)
its attack before the right of self-defense came into operation. This development prompted
a claim to expand the right of reactive self-defense to "anticipatory self-defense."
Anticipatory self-defense, the claim to "do unto others before they do unto you," promised
to vouchsafe the security of the intended victim when he who struck first could deliver an
unacceptable measure of damage, if not win outright. But the move from reactive to antici-
patory self-defense required replacing the objectively verifiable prerequisite of an "armed
attack" with the subjective perception of a "threat" of such an attack that, in the solejudgment
of the state believing itself about to become a target, was so palpable, imminent, and pro-
spectively destructie that the only defense was its prevention.
While all these considerations were redolent of the Caroline incident4 and could thus re-
spond to the defensive needs of the putative victim, they did not fit easily into the Charter
formula and presented serious systemic challenges. Anticipatory self-defense was, and is,
open to abuse by self-serving interpretations in ways that the older right of reactive self-de-
fense was not. Hence, the authority of anticipatory self-defense remained cloudy and much
of formal legal doctrine rejected its lawfulness. Nevertheless, security planners could not
afford to exclude the possibility of its eventuation.
IV.
After atomic bombs brought the Second World War to an abrupt halt, the United States
and the Soviet Union scrambled to acquire larger and increasingly powerful nuclear weap-
ons, together with more sophisticated, varied, and rapid modes for their delivery. As the
strategic specialists on each side gamed the application of these weapons in virtually every
imaginable scenario, it became increasingly clear that a claim of anything like anticipatory
self-defense would be calamitous as between adversaries with significant arsenals of inter-
continental ballistic nuclear missiles. As a result, the latter part of the last century witnessed
the development among the major nuclear adversaries of a special operational code for the
jus ad belium of strategic weapons: the inaptly called "rules of the game." A common interest
in continuous reciprocal deterrence was to be achieved, in a context of intense suspicion
and distrust, by the prospect of mutual assured destruction if the nuclear weapons of one
state were unleashed against the other.
The resulting strategic balance girded each major nuclear power with the assurance that
the other could not attack it. (Ironically, the balance also provided a cogent and not merely
pious basis for arms reductions, for if the principle on which the system now rested was par-
ity, that parity could be achieved at lower and more economic armaments levels.) At the
same time, the balance guaranteed a system of minimum, if imperfect, order for the rest of
the world. By virtue of their military and economic power, these same nuclear states had
' See R. Y.Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82 (1938).
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perforce become global actors-superpowers-whose positions, relative to each other, now
depended on networks of regional alliances. Thus, despite their reciprocal hostility, the su-
perpowers shared urgent interests in ensuring a minimum world order that was sufficiently
stable to prevent local, conventional conflicts from reaching a point where they might so
change geostrategic values as to provoke a nuclear war.
Although this complex of strategic arrangements and understandings now formed the
substructure of minimum world order, the International Court ofJustice could not bring
itself, in its Legality of Nuclear Weapons opinion, to accept it as part of international law.5 The
Court's dictum did not affect the viability of the global security system, but it did show how
far the deans of the college of international law could drift from the operative normative
arrangements upon which international life had come to depend.
V.
The realization by security specialists in the United States and the then Soviet Union of
the essentiality of the regime of mutually assured destruction to their survival led, logically,
if counterintuitively, to another conclusion: an antiballistic missile (ABM) weapon, like the
development of more precise weapons, could disturb the parity underlying the international
security system they had established. A comprehensive and effective ABM system in one
superpower would have defeated the deterrence mechanism by tempting that state to strike
first and then hunker down behind its shield, which, in theory, would cause the second strik-
er's nuclear missiles to bounce off harmlessly. The mere deployment of a significant ABM
could revive the need for strategic anticipatory self-defense. Hence, a treaty outlawing the
development and wide deployment of ABM systems was an inevitable and organic offshoot
of the strategic regime.6
But all legal arrangements are responses to present and projected contexts. The mech-
anism of mutually assured destruction and the system of minimum world order that it sus-
tained presupposed the exclusive availability of nuclear weapons to a small number of "like-
minded" states. The system could operate as long as the United States, the Soviet Union,
and, perhaps, China were the only possessors of nuclear arsenals that were sufficiently large
and geographically dispersed to withstand a first strike by an adversary and still riposte with
a level of assured destruction so unacceptable to the putative first striker that its very antici-
pation would lead that state to resist the temptation and abandon its plan.
This necessary strut of the system threatened to crumble as the elites of various other states,
who did not share the common perspectives and global responsibilities of the leaders of the
nuclear club's charter members, struggled to acquire their own nuclear weapons and inter-
continental delivery systems. During the same period, the Soviet Union expired, leaving the
United States as the lone superpower and ultimate actor in international politics.
If other states, with territorial ambitions rather than global interests, were to acquire a lim-
ited number of nuclear weapons, the major powers would be unable to maintain the mini-
mum order upon which the international system has come to rely. An Iraq that could threat-
en European or North American cities with one or two nuclear missiles, or a North Korea
with a capacity to threaten South Korea orJapan, could then engage in unlawful adventures
yet paralyze the key permanent members of the Security Council, upon which regional and
international order depends, both legally and factually. The key members of the Council
are democracies, which are easily mobilized for urgent self-defense but far less prepared to
make altruistic sacrifices. No leader of a democratic government would be able to undertake
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226 (July 8).6 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-USSR, 23 UST 3435,944 UNTS 13.
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elective military action in defense of regional or world order, if a probable cost of victory
were the nuclear destruction of one of the country's own major cities.
Concerns arose over the incipient arsenals, political objectives, and command-control
systems (such as they were) of the new or soon-to-be nuclear powers. An antiballistic missile
system, theretofore rejected by the ABM Treaty as incompatible with strategic defense and
world order, reemerged as an urgent priority for many defense specialists in the United States.
No serious student of the subject could harbor the illusion that a feasible ABM system might
screen the United States against a full nuclear fusillade from Russia's large arsenal, whether
in a first or a second strike. As between the United States and Russia, the strategic balance
of their respective nuclear arsenals would still sustain a deterrence regime based on mutually
assured destruction. But an ABM system, it was thought, might be an effective screen against
the two or three missiles that one of the new nuclear states might be able to fire. ABM weap-
ons would thus neutralize the limited nuclear weapons capacity of the small nuclear states and
prevent that unpredictable capacity from undermining the continuing superpower provision
of stability in critical regions. Hence the obsolescence of the raison d'etre of the ABM Treaty,
its denunciation by the Bush administration,7 and the now feverish efforts in states as diverse
as the United States, Israel,Japan, and others to develop and deploy various types of opera-
tional antiballistic missile systems.
The prospect of the termination of the ABM Treaty provoked such a furious chorus of crit-
icism that one would have thought the sky was about to fall. But, unlike the claim for antici-
patory self-defense and wholly apart from the serious question of whether ABMs could work
or were cost-effective, the introduction of ABM systems did not threaten to undermine mini-
mum order, for they could not affect the regime of mutual assured destruction of the nucle-
ar club's charter members. ABM systems did, however, promise to enhance the ability of the
major nuclear and other potentially targeted states to protect themselves from limited nuclear
attack by other states.
VI.
One of the factors that had made the inherited jus ad bellum effective was the concentra-
tion of weapons in the hands of territorial elites who were subject to the dynamic of reci-
procity and retaliation that underlies international law. That dynamic does not operate for
nonstate actors, for they are neither beneficiaries of nor hostages to the territorial system.
As long as nonstate actors did not amass significant arsenals, their indifference or even hos-
tility to world public order was inconsequential.
The proliferation of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, the so-called ABC weap-
ons, and their diffusion into the hands of nonstate actors has changed that. Even if an ABM
system could screen the few nuclear weapons likely to be fired intercontinentally from the ter-
ritory of an adversary, the United States, on the morning of September 11, 2001, awoke to
a new reality. There are many other ways that the cluster of nonstate groups referred to as
Al Qaeda can deliver highly destructive weapons to what has since come to be called "the
homeland." Biological and chemical weapons cannot be screened by an ABM system. Nor
can the most effective ABM system prevent the infiltration and detonation of a "dirty bomb."
Nor can deterrence operate without an address to deter. As President Bush confessed, "De-
terrence-the promise of massive retaliation against nations-means nothing against shad-
owy terrorist networks with no nations or citizens to defend."8 These developments have given
new impetus to a claim of preemptive, as opposed to anticipatory, self-defense.
7 Ari Fleischer, ABM Treaty Fact Sheet: Announcement of Withdrawal from the Abm [sic] Treaty (Dec. 13,
2001), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12>.
SGeorgeW. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States MilitaryAcademy in WestPoint (June 1,2002),
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 944, 946 (June 10, 2002).
[Vol. 97:82
HeinOnline -- 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 86 2003
EDITORIAL COMMENT
"Preemptive self-defense" is broader than anticipatory self-defense. Although different def-
initions have been proffered, preemptive self-defense is essentially a "nip in the bud" strategy.
It is a claim to use unilaterally, and without prior international authorization, high levels of
violence to arrest an incipient development that is not yet operational, hence not yet directly
threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could then be neutralized only at a higher and
possibly unacceptable cost. A credible claim for anticipatory self-defense must point to a pal-
pable and imminent threat. A claim for preemptive self-defense can point only to a possi-
bility, a contingency. As one moves from an actual armed attack as the requisite threshold of
reactive self-defense, to the palpable and imminent threat of attack, which is the threshold of
preventive self-defense, and from there to the conjectural and contingent threat of possible
attack, which is the threshold of preemptive self-defense, the need for interpretive latitude
of the would-be unilateralist and his burden of proof become ever greater. In an interna-
tional system marked by radically different values and factual perceptions, an act of preemp-
tive self-defense will often look like a serious or hysterical misjudgment to some actors and
like naked aggression to others.
Analytically, the claim to engage, in certain circumstances, in a "regime change" is a corol-
lary of preemptive self-defense. For if a regime that is animated by unlawful ambitions against
its neighbors continues to develop the ABC weapons, and especially if it does so in violation
of international commitments, the deprivation of those weapons in a single instance may
only reinforce the regime's intentions to try even harder the next time to develop and de-
ploy the weapons so that it can then paralyze subsequent efforts to control it.
VII.
The United States claim to engage in preemptive self-defense is not new. It was made im-
plicitly by the Clinton administration with respect to aerial military action to "degrade" Iraqi
military capacities, actions that continue to the present. There may have been more explicit
applications. President Clinton recently stated that "[w] e actually drew up plans to attack
North Korea and to destroy their reactors and we told them we would attack unless they
ended their nuclear programme."9 That threat was apparently an effective preemption. But
if threats or overt acts aimed at degradation of an adversary's arsenal fail, will further and
even more intrusive preemptive acts against the adversary be deemed permissible under the
rubric of self-defense?
OnJune 1, 2002, President Bush stated: "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his
plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge."1 On September 17, 2002, he
made explicit and expanded the claim to preemptive action that had been an active part of
America's legal arsenal in the previous decade. He said:
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:
" direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international
power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and
any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;
" defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and
abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While
the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international
community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of
'Elaine Monaghan, Clinton Planned Attack on Korean Nuclear Reactors, TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2002, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Major World Newspapers File; see also Toby Sterling, Clinton: N. Korea WarnedAboutReactor,
AP, Dec. 15, 2002, available in 2002 WL 104356190.
'0 Bush, supra note 8, at 946.
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self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from
doing harm against our people and our country; and
* denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or
compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities. 1
Even more explicitly, the President's National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
issued in December 2002, stated: "Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the po-
tentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S.
military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against
WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures."' 2
The unilateralism of these claims has been decried by some critics as if it were the major
innovation here. In fact, it is not very different from the approach of the previous adminis-
tration, which had said, famously, "We act in concert with the international community when-
ever possible, but do not hesitate to act unilaterally when necessary." 3 The issue is not the law-
fulness of unilateral action in self-defense, which, after all, is the essential formula of Charter
Article 51. The issue is, rather, an explicit claim to preemptive self-defense.
VIII.
International law has been grappling with the claim of preemptive self-defense for de-
cades. In 1967 the initiation of the Six-Day War by an Israeli air attack on Egyptian airports
was not condemned by the institutions of the international community. The relation that
prevailed between Egypt and Israel at the time may have already been one of belligerency, so
that the air attack could have been seen as anticipatory or even reactive, rather than preemp-
tive, self-defense. If a state of war exists, a belligerent need not wait until its adversary strikes
in order to respond militarily, but is entitled, itself, to select the moment of initiation or re-
sumption of overt conflict. Since the relation between Al Qaeda and the United States can
generally be characterized as a state of war, 4 it would be inappropriate to characterize uni-
lateral United States actions after September 11 as falling in the area of preemptive self-de-
fense. In contrast, the Israeli destruction of the Osirak reactor near Baghdad in 1981 was a quin-
tessential preemptive action. At the time, it was widely condemned as a violation of interna-
tional law. Scarcely a decade later, after the lethal and aggressive character of the regime
in Baghdad was exposed, opinions about the preemptive action of 1981 underwent revision
in many quarters, suggesting that there may be unarticulated, but operative, criteria for as-
sessing the lawfulness of preemptive actions.
By their nature, all acts of self-defense are initiated unilaterally and evaluated for their law-
fulness only after the fact. In all claims to self-defense, the international legal review of the
action will be based upon a prudential contextual assessment of factors such as the degree
of the threat presented, the availability of a meaningful organized international response, the
urgency of unilateral action to prevent or deflect the attack, and the proportionality of the
means chosen to the necessity presented by the threat. Thus, on a case-by-case basis, the le-
gal danger of an abuse of preemptive self-defense is no greater than for anticipatory self-de-
fense, which also does not require an "armed attack" tojustify it. Humanitarian intervention
"1 NATIONAL SECURITYSTRATEGYOFTHE UNITED STATES 6 (Sept. 2002), availableat<http://www.whitehouse.gov/
response/index.html>.
12 NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (Dec. 2002), available at <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/response/index.html>.
13 A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY 19-20 (Dec. 1999), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/jel/otherpubs/nssr.99.pdf>.
14 By characterizing as essentially "law enforcement" questions the prior attacks on the Khobar Towers, the
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the USS Cole in Aden harbor, one might argue, as some have, that
the United States was not at war as of 8 A.M. on September 11, 2001. Only a most technical and arid legalism could
deny that it is now.
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does not even require a demonstration of a real or conjectural threat against the inter-
vening state or states. The danger presented by the installation of a doctrine of preemptive
self-defense is systemic: if writ large and generally available in international law, it is even
more likely than anticipatory self-defense to lead to greater resort to international violence
by further lowering the threshold for unilaterally determined contingencies that warrant
acts of self-defense. This potential could create an imperative for all latent adversaries to strike
sooner so as to strike first, raising the general expectation of violence and the likelihood of
its eventuation.
Fear of an inexorable slide down that precipitous slope appeared to have been the concern
of the International Court ofJustice in Nicaragua, where, as noted above, the Court set the le-
gal bar for the initiation of actions in self-defense at a rather high notch and, in effect, asked
targeted populations simply to endure the consequences of protracted low-level conflict. In
transposing the Court's policy prescription from a context of low-level protracted conflict
conducted with relatively primitive and inherently focused weapons to a situation in which
nonstate actors, armed with weapons of mass destruction, animated by manifestly hostile in-
tentions, and impervious to the controls of reciprocity and retaliation that operate on terri-
torial elites, are preparing the wherewithal for attack or actually readying to attack, interna-
tional law would now be demanding that target states tolerate a much higher toll of death
and destruction without trying to prevent it by prior unilateral action. Such a transposition
of the International Court's policy position in Nicaragua puts international law on a head-on
collision course with democratic politics, for a government in a functioning democracy
whose population faces such violence will not last long if, in the circumstances, it tells its
electorate that international law prevents it from taking anticipatory or preemptive action.
Ix.
A critical factor in the acceptance and incorporation of a new claim into the corpus of
international law is whether it serves the common interests of the aggregate of actors. Thus,
the responsibility of the international lawyer here is to assess innovative claims carefully for
their contribution, in present and projected contexts, to the essential goals of law.
For all the fury it provoked, the claim to develop an ABM system posed no challenge to the
international security system. It does not threaten the effectiveness of the deterrence mech-
anism operating between the major nuclear powers, while an operational ABM system would
provide an entirely passive self-defense mode to states likely to be targets of surprise ABC
missile attacks. It is, by its nature, only defensive. Moreover, the denunciation of the ABM
Treaty did not undermine the viability of the international treaty regime, for the treaty in
question was susceptible, by its terms, to termination, on notice.
"Regime change" is a euphemism for externally provoked and managed coups d'6tat. A
broad and unilateral right of regime change, by itself, can hardly be accommodated within
the ensemble of policies of international law. If it became generally lawful, it would lead to
more frequent unsupervised meddling in the processes of choice within other states. But re-
gime change may be internationally lawful when it is the contextually appropriate instrument
of an intrinsically lawful action. Recall that regime change has always figured as one of the
strategic objectives of humanitarian intervention, a claim to use force unilaterally, hitherto
controversial, that appears to have acquired more legitimacy since NATO bombed Serbia
and Kosovo in 1999 and the various commissions established to review the lawfulness of the
action essentially concluded that it was illegal but, in the circumstances, the right thing to do. 5
If preemptive self-defense is potentially lawful and the conditions that obtain in a particular
15 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE-FOURTH REPORT, Kosovo (May 23, 2000), available
at<http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm>; INDEPENDENT INTER-
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT (Oct. 2000) (on file with author).
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case warrant resort to it, the legality of an instrumental regime change will turn on its neces-
sity, proportionality, and discrimination.
But can a preemptive self-defense action be lawful? It is not hard to imagine circumstances
in which such action might appear justified. Yet the claim, if universalized, could increase
the expectation of and resort to violence and undermine minimum order. Its challenge to
international law, at least with respect to a prospective preemptive strike against Iraq, may
be finessed by construing various Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII as fully
authorizing the action for the material breach of prior resolutions. Alternatively, the claim
to engage in preemptive action may be partially rejected by being confined to the status of an
American "doctrine," rather like the Monroe Doctrine in the days of the League of Nations.
In modern international law, a doctrine-such as the Brezhnev, Carter, and Reagan doc-
trines-consists of a formal and credible statement by a significant international actor of a
firm policy and the resolve to implement it upon certain contingencies. Doctrines are posi-
tioned at the interface of law and power. They are not based on a general right that is theo-
retically available to other states. By their nature, they constitute a demand for an exception.
Not all doctrines conform with existing international law, but doctrines do contribute to
minimum order by stabilizing the expectations of all actors as to the consequences of certain
types of action and thus aid in avoiding adventures and mistakes.
If preemptive self-defense is only an American doctrine, reserved to the global superpower
for its episodic forays as international policeman, at least the danger of its rampant use by
many other states is contained. The danger of its abuse by an uncontrolled superpower is not.
But the potential for abuse here does not derive from the power of a single state. Rather, it
inheres in a legal system that continues to maintain weak central institutions and accordingly
reserves to each state, in the words of the French text of Article 51 of the Charter, a droit na-
turel to engage in unilateral action when necessary for its self-defense, while assigning the
residual responsibility for global security to a small group of powerful states.
Until the installation of an effective world constitutive process, which will remove the need
to rely upon unilateral action for the achievement of key international goals, it will be for
the college of international lawyers to establish criteria for the lawfulness of the initiation
and application of unilateral anticipatory and preemptive defensive actions. 6 Their lodestar
will be the legitimacy of self-defense insofar as it is implemented in accordance with the ven-
erable policies of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. But because the context has
changed, the legal arrangements to implement these policies of international law must change
as well. Legal creativity and factual realism in this area are called for in equally urgent mea-
sure, for if the effectiveness and soundness of a future international regime about the unilat-
eral use of force remain clouded in uncertainty, the insufficiency of the inherited regime,
which was designed for a context of weapons and adversaries that has changed forever, is
certain beyond peradventure.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN*
They will find considerable assistance in this task in MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW
AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 63 (1961).
* The source for the epigraph to this Editorial is Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv.
457,469 (1897). James E. Baker and Andrew Willard read earlier drafts and made useful comments and criticisms.
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